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BUDGET POLICY AND ECONOMIC STABILITY IN
POSTWAR JAPAN*
By WAYNE SNYDER AND TSUTOMU TANAKA'
THE "MIRACLE" of postwar Japanese growth is widely acknowledged, and a
-substantial literature now exists which attempts to interpret and explain the
main features of this unique phenomenon.2 Our purpose is to compliment the
existing studies by measuring the effects of various types of budget changes and
evaluating their impact on the achievement of economic stability and balanced
growth during the sixteen-year period from 1952 through 1967.3 The basic
methods and framework of analysis are those developed by Bent Hansen [3] for
a recent OECD survey which gives the institutional background to budgetary
action and an analysis of the nature and effects of fiscal policy for each of seven
member countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United King-
dom, and the United States. Here, we shall supplement the Hansen study by
providing a similar analysis for another major country, Japan.
Economic stability is viewed from two different perspectives: the combined
impact of all government budgets on short-term fluctuations in demand and
their impact on the long-term achievement of full utilization of Japan's poten-
tial output. In addition, disaggregated budget impacts are examined for each
government sector (e.g., central government, local government, social security,
public enterprise investment), and discretionary changes are distinguished from
.automatic budget responses where possible. Section 1 describes briefly the struc-
ture and some of the main changes in public finance in Japan since 1952; Sec-
tion 2 explains the methodology used to estimate the budget impact and gives
the data for the effects of the various budget changes which are the basis for the
subsequent analysis; Section 3 analyzes the impact of budget changes in relation
to short-term stability, with a discussion of the automatic responses of the tax
system; Section 4 assesses the degree to which the total budget enhanced the
achievement of the full use of Japan's economic potential. The conclusion,
Section 5, compares Japan's postwar budget experience with seven other OECD
countries. Data used to calculate some of the relationships are given in the
Appendix.
* Manuscript received July 29, 1970; revised April 19, 1971.
1 Our debt to Bent Hansen is great, as will become evident, and we wish to thank him warm-
ly for developing the framework of analysis which is used in this study. We also wish to thank
an anonymous referee for several suggestions which were used to improve this version, Bruce
Snapp for aid in making many calculations, and Janet Eckstein for her editorial assistance.
2 For a concise, well written discussion of both the pre- and postwar periods, see Madison [9].
3 At least one other paper [5] deals with the same problem and employs a similar approach,
although the period covered ends at 1960. Several recent (1970) issues of the Economic Plann-
ing Agency's journal [16] also contain studies about the government sector.
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1. THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The public sector in Japan is smaller than in Western Europe and the United
States. The sum of central and local government current expenditures for goods
and services plus social security benefits and other transfers to households plus
general government investment plus government enterprise and public corpora-
tion investment in fixed capital formation and stocks amounted to 20 per cent
of GNP in 1951 (see Appendix, Tables Al-A4). During the following sixteen
years it rose to 25 per cent, with the largest increases occurring in government
enterprise and public corporation investment and social security benefits, but
the comparable increases in the major Western countries were even larger (total
public expenditures now average about 30 per cent of GNP but rise to a high
of 40 per cent in Sweden).4 Total gross tax revenues (including social security
contributions) were also relatively small in 1951 (21 per cent of GNP), and,,
contrary to the experience in other countries, they declined to a smaller propor-
tion of GNP by the end of the period (19 per cent). Most of the decline oc-
curred in the central government sector, where both direct taxes on households.
and indirect taxes declined as a percentage of GNP (see Section 3 for a general
discussion of discretionary and automatic changes of the tax system).
The governmental system of public finance is extraordinarily complex; the-
central government includes a number of important "Special Accounts," and
there is an interlocking arrangement of transfers and shared taxes with the local
government sector. Nevertheless, if current and investment expenditures for
goods and services are taken as the measure of comparison, in 1967 the local
government sector was larger (8 per cent of GNP) than the central government
sector (6 per cent of GNP). This too is an almost unique phenomenon: for most
Western countries (except Germany) the reverse relationship is usual. As in the:
case among the other developed nations, the social security sector has grown
the fastest; benefits increased from 1.6 to 3.5 per cent of GNP between 1951 and
1961. This is still a low percentage by European standards (typically near 10
per cent of GNP), but it is comparable with the United States, which like Japan
relies more on privately financed social welfare plans than on public ones. In-
vestments in fixed capital by government enterprises and public corporations.
was another area which increased its relative importance, growing from 1.7 to.
3.8 per cent of GNP during the sixteen years.
2. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF BUDGET CHANGES
In order to evaluate the effect of budget policies on economic stability and
growth, it is first necessary to estimate their impact on domestic demand. In
this section we use the definition and methods developed by Hansen to estimate
the budget effect;5 these are based, in turn, on the earlier contribution of Brown
[1], Hansen [2], Lindbeck [7], and Musgrave [10]. Although the Hansen model
4 For more comparative data about the other countries, see Hansen [3, (Chapter 2)].
5 For a complete description of the methods used to measure budgetary effects, see Hansen.
[3, (Chapter 1)].
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is small compared with the large econometric models which have been developed
for some countries, including Japan,6 it is adequate to measure the relative im-
portance of various types of budget changes. Although quarterly data exist for
Japan, they are not sufficiently detailed to permit the desired degree of disag-
gregated budgetary analysis. Hence only year-to-year changes are used-as
Hansen did also, in order to maintain comparability among all seven countries
-and these are no lags.7 The model assumes that private investment and exports
are exogenously determined. The model uses multipliers of various magnitudes
to determine the impact of different kinds of budget changes, after allowing for
leakages due to the estimated marginal propensities for consumption, imports,
.and direct and indirect taxes. Government expenditures distinguish between
volume and price changes, the latter necessitated by the differentiation of direct
from indirect taxes.
The Hansen methodology for measuring the combined impact on domestic
demand of both automatic and discretionary effects of budget changes includes
the direct impact brought about by the initial budget change as well as the sub-
sequent indirect or "multiplier" effect.8 Hansen's formula for the total of all
the direct and indirect effects is based on a truncated version of his model which
allows for all changes in revenue which are not credit transactions and for all
purchases of goods and services:
Total Effect = 1 [(dg + ds) + a(1 - p)(gdpg + sdps)
(1) 1 -a(1 -p)
- (1 - p)dTi - a(l - p)dTd]
where a is the marginal propensity to consume; p is the marginal propensity to
import with respect to GNP; dg and ds are annual changes in the volume of
goods and services (respectively) purchased by government; gdpg and sdp, are
changes in the value of goods and services due to price or wage changes; dlT and
.d Td are annual changes in indirect and direct personal taxes.
The Hansen model also permits estimating, separately, the discretionary and
automatic effects of budget changes. An explicit expression for the automatic
effects of tax changes can be derived from the Hansen model, but as the total
effects of budget changes are the sum of automatic and discretionary changes,
it is easier to define them simply as the difference between total and discretion-
ary effects. The formula for the latter is the following:
6 For one of the several econometric models of the Japanese economy, see Tatemoto, Uchida,
and Watanabe [11].
7 A review of several big models suggests that 3/4 or more of the budget effect generally occurs
during the first year, hence the absence of explicit lags is not critical; see Hansen [3, (20-22)].
8 An "accelerator" effect should be included too, but (as will be explained later) the model
assumes that all changes in private investment are exogenously determined; hence the measure
-of the budgetary impact is limited in this respect as well as by the other factors described fur-
ther on.
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Discretionary effect = 11 )[(dg + ds)(1 + t,)
(2) 1 + ti - a(1 - p) (1 - td)
- cdt1 (1 - p) - ydtd(1 - p)a]
where t, and td are the marginal rate of indirect and direct taxes on households,
respectively, and cdt, and ydtd are discretionary changes in indirect and direct
taxes, respectively. Equation (2) counts all changes in the volume of govern-
ment purchases of goods and services as discretionary, whereas in reality some
expenditures are tied to legislated norms and programs (e.g., social security
benefits). On the other hand, all budget effects from changes in prices and
wages paid by the government are considered to be automatic, although the
government does have control over some prices (e.g., goods and services pro-
duced by government enterprises and public corporations, and commodity price
support programs), and over when and by how much government wages are
increased. But because the Japanese government is not highly centralized in its
authority to fix prices permanently, eventually the salaries and prices it pays
must adjust to those in the rest of the economy; hence to assume that the im-
pact of price changes is an automatic effect seems more appropriate than to
include them among the discretionary effects.
The multipliers for the various types of budget changes differ, of course, and
these and the leakage coefficients are given in Table 1. The consumption coef-
ficient is small, because a is the ratio of changes in personal consumption to
changes in total private income minus only direct household taxes, a definition
required because the model does not include an explicit corporate sector.9
TABLE 1
LEAKAGE COEFFICIENTS AND MULTIPLIERS
Leakage Coefficients
Marginal rate of direct taxes on households (td)........................... 0.09
Marginal rate of indirect taxes on households (t1).......................0.07
Marginal rate of consumption (a)....................................... 0.60
M arginal rate of imports (p)............................................0.15
Multipliers for discretionary effects
Changes in the volume of government domestic purchases (dgd + dl) ...... 1.75
Changes in rates of direct taxes on households (ydtd)....................0.84
Changes in rates of indirect taxes on households (cdt;) .................. 1.39
Multipliers for total effects
Changes in the volume of government domestic purchases (dgd + dl) ...... 2.04
Changes in the value of government domestic purchases due to
wage-price changes (gdpg + ldw) and changes in total direct
taxes on households (dTd)............................................ 1.04
Changes in total indirect taxes on households (d T ,)....................... 1.73
9 No model can attempt to explain everything, and Hansen's is no exception. Perhaps the
most conspicuous omissions are that private investment is treated as an exogenous variable and
that the corporate sector is not made explicit. The first can be explained by the inadequate.
knowledge about investment functions, and the second feature was necessary to maintain com-
parability among the seven countries, because the national accounts data did not all give ad-
equate information about corporate profits and taxes.
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As the model assumes that the marginal propensities to consume and import
and the marginal rates of direct and indirect taxation were constant throughout
the period 1952-67, some explanation is necessary. The consumption function
remained very stable during the period considered, and no discernible shifting
occurred. During three periods-1954/55, 1958/59, and 1962/63-the rates of
change in total private and personal disposable income were substantially less
than the changes in consumption, and so for these periods the assumption of a
constant propensity to consume is less valid than for the remaining years. The
effect of this on the multiplier for the budget changes was compensated by the fact
that during these same years the propensity to import changed in the opposite
direction, and the two effects tended to cancel one another. For the period as
a whole the relationship between imports and GNP also remained stable. The
multipliers also depend on the values of the marginal tax rates. These are, of
course, based on the automatic response rates of direct and indirect taxes, in-
dependent of discretionary changes in the system. While the marginal rates were
reasonably stable, they did vary somewhat and in Section 3 we shall discuss
this further.
The basic data for estimating the various budget effects come from the re-
cently revised national accounts [13]. Data about discretionary tax changes.
were provided by the Ministry of Finance. In order to compare the budget im-
pact of one year with another, they were normalized by expressing them as a
percentage of the previous year's GNP. (All data are for the fiscal year, which
runs from April through March of the following year.) The estimates of the
various budget effects given in Table 2 were obtained in this manner. For the
data used in Figure 5, however, it was necessary to use the appropriate GNP
deflators in order to express the budget effects in constant 1965 prices.
Before we examine the short-term stabilizing effects of the budget, a few re-
marks should be made about the Japanese economy during the period 1952-67
and about the general importance of the budgetary impact, based on the es-
timates given in Table 2.
1952 is an appropriate year to begin an analysis of Japanese postwar budget
policies, because the adjustments following the cessation of hostilities were gen-
erally completed and industrial production had regained its prewar level. From
1952 on the unemployment level remained low and the labor market was gen-
erally tight. Urban demand for labor was partially met by a transfer from the
rural areas where agricultural employment declined. But around 1960 it became
increasingly difficult to withdraw qualified labor from agriculture, and a generally
tight market came under greater strain. This was reflected in the rise of con-
sumer prices; measured by the private consumption deflator, the rate had been
less than 3 per cent annually before 1960 but it averaged more than 5 per cent
afterwards. Thus Japan's demand management problems are more comparable
with those European countries which had high rates of employment than with
the United States, where unemployment averaged about 5 per cent in the same
period.
During the sixteen years of the period surveyed, GNP in constant prices grew
TABLE 1
EFFECTS OF ANNUAL BUDGET CHANGES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP,- 1, 1952-67a
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 Ave.
Total effect of public sector 1.6 2.3 0.5 3.0 -4.1 0.8 2.8 2.3 0.0 1.6 5.5 1.6 2.5 3.5 2.4 2.2 1.8
Government enterprise and public
corporation investment 1.1 1.4 -0.1 1.1 0.6 1.3 0.7 0.9 0.7 2.4 1.7 1.4 -0.2 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.1
Changes in government enterprise
and public corporation stocks 0.2 -1.4 -0.3 3.5 -2.1 -0.8 0.5 0.2 0.0 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 1.1 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.1
General government 0.4 2.2 1.0 -1.6 -2.6 0.2 1.6 1.2 -0.7 -0.2 3.4 0.8 1.6 1.8 1.3 0.0 0.6
Local government -0.3 -0.7 0.7 -1.2 -0.7 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.8 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.4
Investment expenditure
(volume) -0.7 1.3 0.2 -0.8 -0.8 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.5 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5
Current expenditure (volume) -1.2 -2.2 0.9 -0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3
Indirect taxes -1.0 -0.6 -1.2 0.2 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 1.5 -1.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -0.5 -0.9 -1.3 -0.9
Direct household taxes 0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.2 0.6 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1
Wage and Price changes 2.0 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6
Social security 0.4 0.1 1.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Central government 0.2 2.8 -0.8 -0.2 -1.6 0.3 0.4 0.9 -1.0 -1.1 1.6 0.0 0.4 1.3 0.6 -0.3 0.2
Discretionary 3.4 4.9 0.0 0.7 0.2 1.4 0.8 1.4 0.7 0.9 2.1 1.3 0.7 1.1 1.2 0.5 1.3
Investment expenditure
(volume) 0.9 0.9 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.5
Current expenditure (volume) 0.9 2.3 -0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.4
Indirect taxes -0.2 0.7 -0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0
Direct household taxes 1.7 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
Automatic -3.1 -2.1 -0.7 -0.9 -1.8 -1.1 -0.5 -0.6 -1.7 -2.0 -0.5 -1.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.7 -0.8 -1.1
Taxes -3.8 -2.7 -0.9 -1.0 -2.1 -1.4 -0.5 -0.8 -2.1 -2.4 -0.7 -1.6 -0.7 -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.4
Wages and price changes 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
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by an average rate of 9.6 per cent which was more than 50 per cent higher than
in the Western country with the next highest growth rate, Germany. The ex-
pansionary impact of budget changes in the public sector accounted for an es-
timated 1.8 percentage points, or about one-fifth, of this growth rate (see Table
2), a proportion comparable with that in several Western countries but rather
higher than in Germany or the United States. However, because of the small
size of Japan's public sector relative to other countries, the expansionary bud-
getary policies have been more important than elsewhere in accounting for the
average growth rate, but they have still not been a particularly large factor. It
should be noted that the investment expenditures of government enterprises and
public corporations accounted for 1.1 per cent, so that general government's con-
tribution was rather smaller than in most Western countries. Of the remaining.
average expansionary effects from government budget changes, neither stock ac-
cumulation nor the social security system contributed significantly, the latter re-
flecting its general design to be self-financing in the long run. Local government
on the average added more (0.4 per cent of GNP) than central government (0.2
per cent), which is also consistent with our previous comment about the relative
size of expenditures by the two government sectors. The impact of discretion-
ary changes in expenditures and taxes was generally expansive but was nearly
offset by automatic tax increases (about which more in the next section).
3. AN EVALUATION OF SHORT-TERM STABILIZATION
Short-term fluctuations have been as strong and occasionally stronger in Japan
during the period surveyed than in the two Western countries-Germany and
the United States-which experienced similarly large peak-to-trough variations
in their growth rates, which sometimes amounted to 8 or 9 per cent of GNP.
Acknowledging that the average growth of 9.6 per cent was exceptionally high,
it is nevertheless of interest to assess the impact which budget policies had on
either dampening or reinforcing the short-term disturbances. In this section we
shall investigate the effect of the entire public sector and we shall also look at
the impact of individual government sectors; we shall separate the impact of
discretionary budget changes from the automatic or built-in stabilizing effects
where possible, and discuss briefly tax elasticities. The norm for comparison in
this section shall be the average growth rate. We would argue that ceteris pari-
bus, a stable growth rate is desirable; we recognize, however, that merely damp-
ening potential cyclical swings is not the only relevant criterion by which the
impact of budget policies should be judged, and Section 4 deals with other
aspects of economic stability.
The short-term stabilizing effect of budget changes cannot be compared with
actual GNP, because actual GNP is itself influenced by budget policies. We can
however construct a hypothetical series of GNP by subtracting from the actual
GNP growth rate the total effect of budget changes in the public sector for each
year. This derived series is called the "pure cycle," because it attempts to es-
timate what GNP growth would have occurred in the absence of any change in
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FIGURE 1
PURE CYCLE AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT PLUS EXPORTS
the budget from one year to the next. This is not the only pure cycle that
could be constructed. For a growing economy, in subtracting the budgetary
impact from the actual GNP, one might want to omit automatic tax increases
and those expenditure increases also deemed automatic in order to concentrate
only on the discretionary effects of budget policies. Similarly, a pure cycle which
excluded only the discretionary effects would be relevant if one wished to eval-
uate the importance of the built-in automatic stabilizers. Without actually con-
structing these other pure cycles, the stabilizing effects of discretionary and
automatic budget changes are discussed qualitatively and separately below. It
should also be noted that the pure cycle still incorporates the effects of other
government policies (e.g., monetary and direct controls) and autonomous forces
(e.g., private investment and exports). Hence, the pure cycle is not so "pure,"
but nevertheless it is a useful analytical device.
After construction of the "pure cycle," a logical next step is to ascertain the
strength of the relationship between it and the traditional "exogenous" deter-
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FIGURE 2
BUDGET IMPACT OF PUBLIC SECTOR
minants of fluctuations in demand: private investment and exports. These rela-
tionships are given in Figure 1. The co-variation in the two series is strong and,
prima facie, one might conclude that Japan witnessed a series of classical busi-
ness cycles between 1952 and 1967, caused by fluctuations in private investment
and exports. Although indeed fluctuations in demand were substantial and in
large measure related to variations in exports and, especially, private invest-
ment, the latter was itself partly influenced by government policies, principally
monetary and credit controls. In Section 4 we shall discuss the methodological
problems this raises, but for 'the present the pure cycle will be used for the
basis of comparing the short-term stabilizing or destabilizing impact of budget
changes.
We shall define "potential" short-term stabilization as the (absolute) differ-
ence between the pure cycle and the average rate of GNP growth. Potential
stabilization for the entire period is simply the cumulated sum for the years
from 1952 through 1967. We shall also define a budget effect to be stabilizing
if its impact tended to reduce the difference between the pure cycle and the aver-
age rate of GNP growth. Figure 2 shows the actual GNP growth rate (solid
line), the pure cycle (dashed line), and the average GNP growth rate (9.6 per
cent). The arrows indicate the direction of the total effects of budget changes
in the public sector, and they point from the pure cycle to the actual GNP; their
magnitudes are identical with the data given in Table 2.
This visual presentation of the budgetary effects illustrates how they were
generally expansive, but it also shows how relatively little they altered the cy-
clical fluctuations. More precisely, the extent to which they were a stabilizing
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(or destabilizing) factor can be measured as follows. The cumulated amount of
potential stabilization was 54 per cent (of a typical year's GNP). Total stabilizing
effects, as defined above, amouted to 20 per cent. These were, however, largely
offset by the 16 per cent destabilizing effects. Therefore, the net amount of sta-
bilization achieved was not very significant.
It could be, of course, that the impacts of some government sectors were gen-
erally anti-cyclical while others were pro-cyclical, thus accounting for the ab-
sence of any net stabilizing effects. But if we look at each sector's impact sep-
arately, we find no difference between the aggregate performance of the entire
public sector and any of the sub-sectors.
Another interesting point from which to appraise the short-term impact of
budget policies is to separate the discretionary from the automatic effects. This
can be done, however, only for the central government sector, because data about
discretionary changes in the other sectors are inadequate. Figure 3 shows the
annual changes as previously given in Table 2 (where, it should be recalled, the
effects due to wage and price movements are counted among the automatic ef-
fects). Clearly, the automatic effects have been stabilizing, as they became muclk
less a "drag" during the four periods of economic slow-down: 1954/55, 1958/59,
1962, and 1964/65. It is equally apparent that the impact from discretionary
budget changes was not anti-cyclical (compare Figures 2 and 3).
The Hansen model does not include in the total effects those due to change in
corporate income taxes, although an average leakage is allowed for in the con-
sumption coefficient. Data for both discretionary and automatic tax changes are
available, however, and are shown separately in Figure 3. Clearly, the discre-
tionary changes were very small and could have done little to influence investment.
The automatic changes were more important and may have prevented demand
from slowing down any more than it did in some years, e.g., 1958, 1962, and
1965, although without knowing more about the determinants of investment we:
cannot conclude this for certain.
A summary of the average and marginal tax response rates and their long-run
elasticities with respect to GNP at factor cost is given in Table 3. We have.
already indicated that, unlike experience elsewhere, Japan's experience has been
unique because taxes declined as a proportion of GNP between 1951 and 1967.
This was due to the combined effect of individual tax elasticities and discretion-
ary changes in the rate structure which occurred during the period surveyed.
Direct household rates were reduced in every year during the period except
1960. This explains why in spite of the relatively high long-run elasticity of
this tax, its average rate declined. On balance discretionary changes in the struc-
ture of direct corporate taxes also tended more to reduce than to increase the
marginal response rate, but because the elasticity remained near unity, the av-
erage rate did not noticeably change. Although the various indirect tax rates
were increased more often than they were reduced, their combined average rate
declined substantially, because they are imposed on a small number of com-
modities having low income elasticities, in particular liquor and sugar. While
there appears to have been some change in the elasticity from the first half of
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FIGURE 3
DISCRETIONARY AND AUTOMATIC BUDGETING EFFECTS
TABLE 3
AVERAGE TAX ELASTICITIES WITH RESPECT TO GNP AT
FACTOR COST, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
1952-59 1960-67 1952-67
Indirect taxes
Average response 6.0 4.8 5.4
Marginal response 3.7 3.8 3.7
Elasticity 0.6 0.8 0.7
Direct household taxes
Average response 3.4 2.9 3.2
Marginal response 7.1 5.5 6.3
Elasticity 2.1 1.9 1.9
Direct corporate taxes
Average response 3.2 3.9 3.5
Marginal response 2.8 4.8 3.8
Elasticity 0.9 1.2 1.1
Total tax rates
Average response 12.6 11.6 12.1
Marginal response 13.6 14.1 13.8
Elasticity (weighted) 1.1 1.2 1.1
Source: Appendix, Tables 5-7.
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the period to the last half for each of these three categories of taxes, on balance
the (weighted) elasticity of the central government tax system does not appear
to have changed significantly and remains slightly greater than unity.10
All three taxes-direct, personal and corporate, and indirect-operate anti-
cyclically. Tax collections do not lag far behind actual changes in GNP, and
thus this inherently stabilizing system is not diminished by undesirable lags as.
is the case in some countries, e.g., in the United Kingdom some taxes are col-
lected with so much delay after the income base has changed that they are def-
initely pro rather than anti-cyclical. As might be anticipated, corporate taxes.
respond more to change in GNP than do direct taxes on households but the tax
is not the cause, rather it is because corporate profits vary much more than does
personal income. Indirect taxes are also quite sensitive to changes in GNP but
less so than for the other two kinds of taxes (see Appendix, Tables A6-A8).
These findings generally agree with the more disaggregated study by Ishi [4],
who concluded that the tax-income elasticity for all direct taxes was roughly
1.5, which is identical with the (weighted) elasticity which can be obtained
from the data in Table 3. For the indirect taxes he found the overall elasticity
to be about unity, which is higher than our results and not consistent with the
observed decline in indirect taxes as a proportion of GNP which occurred be-
tween 1951 and 1967 (see Table A2).
4. EVALUATING ECONOMIC STABILITY AND BALANCED GROWTH
In this section we shall assess the budget impact in relation to the desire to
achieve balanced long-term growth. In the previous section we found that the
effect of budget changes did little to mitigate against the sharp short-term fluc-
tuations in GNP. If a longer-term perspective is used instead, the budget im-
pact contributed in a positive manner. This accords with the official view of
authorities in the Japanese Planning Agency who have explained that the gov-
ernment's policy has indeed "not been designed for stimulating rapid growth
but rather for attaining balanced growth. . . " [17, (43)] (italics added).
What constitutes "balanced" growth is of course debatable. One criterion
which has gained use elsewhere is the concept of the "full-employment poten-
tial" which was introduced in President Kennedy's first Economic Report to
Congress [19, (52)]. It was designed to highlight how far the actual perform-
ance since 1955 had fallen short of the full economic potential of the United
States and to illustrate why special government policies were required to achieve
a high level of employment. Undeniably the need for generally more expansive
budget policies was real, because after 1955 the unemployment rate continually
exceeded 4 per cent and surpassed 7 per cent during the 1958 and 1961 reces-
10 The reader may notice in Table 3 that the average ratio of all taxes to GNP at factor cost
declined from 1952-59 to 1960-67 although the overall elasticity is greater than one. The ex-
planation is that the high elasticity of direct household taxes did not cause the average rate to
increase due to the discretionary tax cuts, and this when combined with the general inelasticity
of the indirect tax system caused the average rate to decline although the overall elasticity still
remained greater than unity.
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sions. After considerable congressional and public debate, a series of exceptional
tax reduction laws were passed, which substantially reduced direct taxes on both
households and corporations, and which would eventually eliminate most fed-
eral indirect taxes. The impact of these discretionary measures during 1964 and
1965 finally helped boost the American economy back to a high level of em-
ployment, but during the eleven years which had passed since it had last
operated at what for the United States can be considered its full economic po-
tential (i.e., about 4 per cent unemployment), the cumulated gap between actual
and potential GNP amounted to nearly 50 per cent of a typical year's potential
full employment output (measured at constant 1958 prices).
Both public and private estimates of potential output now exist for Japan.
The official ones [12], [14] and [15] were not, however, known to the authors
when this study was begun, and the estimates used are based on those made by
professor Lundberg [8] in his study of the problems of economic instability faced
by several major countries in the postwar period. Although some minor dif-
ferences exist, Professor Lundberg's ratio of actual to potential output is general-
ly in accord with the official estimates. His study provides estimates for the
years 1951-64: using his method, we have extrapolated through 1967. He de-
fines potential or full employment output to be the combination of an unemploy-
ment rate of 2 per cent, which he considers to be "the minimum feasible un-
employment rate to be applied uniformily for calculating the potential or full
employment labor forces" [7, (99)], and the long-run trend of labor productivity.
His estimates for Japan imply that the annual rate of growth of potential GNP
was about 8 per cent before 1957 and rose to above 10 per cent afterwards. As
the labor force increased more rapidly before 1957 than after (approximately
2 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively), his estimates also imply that a sub-
stantial shift in the trend of labor productivity occurred around 1957 which the
remarkably growing use of capital intensive techniques permitted.
Figure 4 compares Professor Lundberg's estimates of potential output with
the actual growth of GNP from 1951 through 1967 (at constant 1965 prices).
Estimates of potential output are, of course, somewhat problematic, because they
are not independent of economic policy; government policy affects the distribu-
tion of output between consumption and investment and this clearly influences
the rate of growth of the labor force and productivity. But in spite of these
limitations, the estimates provide a useful basis for evaluating the budgetary im-
pact if they are discussed in relation to other policy objectives and instruments.
The objectives of economic policy are everywhere numerous, and the instru-
ments used to achieve them are even more so." Nevertheless, four goals pre-
dominate, although others may temporarily replace some of them from time to
time or one objective may completely dominate for a short while to the detri-
ment of maintaining an appropriate balance among the others; this, we shall see,
has typically been the case with Japan. The four principal items which are of
" One study of economic policy [6, (148-149)] lists eight major conjunctural and structural ob-
jectives and four minor targets; and it enumerates no fewer than sixty-five instruments avail-
able to achieve them.
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GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL: CONSTANT 1965 PRICES
primary concern to all governments are growth, employment, prices, and balance
of payments. Changes in budgetary expenditures and tax rates are only some
of the means by which economic policies influence the economy generally and
the level of demand, particularly its composition. Monetary policies, direct con-
trols, and changes in the institutional framework are other important categories
of instruments at the disposal of governments in their attempt to achieve an ap-
propriate balance among the desired objectives. This study only attempts to
quantify the effects of budgetary policies, although other policies-notably mon-
etary-will be mentioned where appropriate.
For the reasons explained in Section 3, the hypothetical pure cycle is useful
to assess the budgetary impact on balanced growth. In Figure 5 actual GNP and
the pure cycle are expressed as percentage deviations from potential output,
shown for convenience as a horizontal line.
If Figures 2 and 5 are compared we can easily perceive a striking difference
between the absence of any general tendency of the budget impact to dampen
short-term fluctuations in GNP (Figure 2) and a definitely stabilizing effect if the
longer-term criterion of potential output is used (Figure 5). Later, a quantitative
evaluation of this will be given, but first a few general comments about eco-
nomic development in Japan during the period 1952-67.
The typical sequence of events, which was repeated five times during the
period surveyed, was the following. A period of rapid expansion occasioned by
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DEVIATIONS OF ACTUAL GNP AND THE PURE CYCLE FROM POTENTIAL OUTPUT
particularly strong private investment and exports would lead to higher than
normal imports, a deteriorating balance of trade, and ultimately a decline in
Japan's international monetary reserves. This led the government four times to
implement policies aimed at restricting import demand in order to redress the
trade balance and restore the lost reserves. Once sufficient cooling off had been
achieved, policies were relaxed and Japan would begin again its own version of
a "stop/go" syndrome-but with the important difference that the average
growth rate remained phenomenally high, whereas the comparable British ex-
perience was accompanied by one of Europe's lowest growth rates. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the postwar "recessions" were preceded on three
occasions-1952/53, 1957/58, and 1961/62-by a world-wide weakening of ex-
port sales which particularly affected Japan. Thus, it would not be correct to
conclude that the self-enforced economic slow-downs were entirely the result of
domestic policies; the change in export demand was a major factor which led
the authorities to undertake the restrictive policies: mainly monetary although
direct import controls were also used but to a decreasing degree throughout the
period. A brief description of actual developments from 1952 through 1967
will illustrate the above generalization, and will be helpful in putting a proper
perspective on the impact of Japanese budgetary policies.
The years 1952 and 1953 were the height of the Korean War "boom," when
the pure cycle exceeded potential output, and both conjunctural and long-term
considerations called for deflationary policies. Both monetary and budgetary
policies remained expansionary, however, thus adding to the already overheated
situation. This was reflected in a large increase in consumer prices during 1952
(5 per cent) and an even larger amount the following year (8 per cent). During
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1953 the balance of trade situation deteriorated rapidly, the result of stagnating
exports due to the end of the Korean boom and rapidly rising imports, causing
a decline of about $100 million or 10 per cent of Japan's international reserves.
Tight monetary policies were put into effect during 1953 and were kept on
throughout most of 1954. The previous expansionary budget effects of 1952
and 1953 were reduced to a negligible amount for 1954 through discretionary
changes in both expenditures and taxes, although the impact of the latter was
somewhat offset by the automatic stabilizing effect of the tax and social security
system. The deflationary policies were successful and Japan's international re-
serves were quickly rebuilt during 1954, which permitted the authorities to relax
both monetary and budgetary policies in 1955. An OECD Economic Survey of
Japan explained, "The main reason why monetary policy has worked so effi-
ciently in Japan lies probably in the system of strict quantitative controls, im-
plying from time to time drastic cuts in the amounts of new loans granted by
banks, applied by the Bank of Japan" [18, (37-38)].
The easy policies were continued until 1957, when once again the combina-
tion of a somewhat overheated economy with rapidly rising imports and stag-
nating exports led to a loss in reserves amounting to about $100 million.
It should be noted, however, that the budget impact in 1956 had a strong
dampening effect, mostly due to inventory depletion and the strong automatic
increase in tax revenue; and in 1957 the budget effect was virtually nil. Monetary
policies were increasingly tightened throughout 1957 and then slowly removed
after the middle of 1958. As the monetary policies were relaxed, the economy
regained and then surpassed its full employment potential, setting the stage for
another "stop/go" sequence.
The over-heating in 1961 was accompanied by a loss of about $400 million
in reserves, but this was quickly rebuilt in 1962 when monetary and import con-
trols were enforced. The budgetary impact in 1962 was a countervailing force,
due both to discretionary changes in expenditures and taxes and, especially, the
reduced "drag" from automatic tax increases. The tight policies were quickly
reversed when the reserves began to be replaced.
The period of relaxed policies lasted until the middle of 1964, at about which
time declining reserves occurred once again and led the authorities to introduce
restrictive monetary and import policies. The budgetary impact, however, re-
mained expansionary, the increase being substantial in 1965 during the period
of self-imposed economic slow-down, and helped maintain Japan closer to its
full potential than it would have been otherwise because of the deflationary
monetary policies.
Monetary policies were relaxed during 1965 and the sequence began again,
with the consequence that enough overheating had begun to occur in 1967 to
lead the authorities once more to tighten monetary policies, although the loss
in reserves was only negligible that year.
If the budgetary impact appears to have been a definitely stabilizing factor
during the periods of below potential growth, the same cannot be said for it dur-
ing most of the years when the economy was overheated. Thus, we are led to
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the general conclusion that the budget effects helped lift the economy towards
the utilization of its full potential, but few discretionary deflationary budget
measures were taken during the periods of excess demand-although, of course,
the automatic effects helped to dampen what would have been even larger infla-
tionary effects from the budget.
We will now give a quantitative evaluation of the budgetary impact with re-
spect to potential output. However, the fact that the pure cycle retains the
effects of other government policies raises certain methodological problems about
attempting to assess the stabilizing (or destabilizing) impact of budgetary pol-
icies alone. For example, the budgetary impact may be destabilizing (i.e., caus-
ing demand to diverge from potential GNP), but this may be the desired intent
of policies aimed at cooling off an overheated economy. Or, it may be that if
other policies could be quantified, they might have created the original situation
without which the budget alone would have had a stabilizing impact. The re-
verse is equally possible, because budget policies may get credit for stabilization
which properly belong to other economic policies. We cannot eliminate this
dilemma because we have not attempted to quantify the impact of other pol-
icies, notably monetary, although we assume their effect has sometimes been
significant. We have, however, attempted to discuss their impact in a qualita-
tive way, and thus indicate how our final evaluation of budgetary policies alone
might need to be modified.
This does not exhaust all the conceptual problems; at least one more should
be discussed. In cases where the budgetary impact is in the right direction but
exceeds the amount necessary to reach potential output, how should the total
effect be counted? It seemed sensible to divide the impact into two components:
the part that was stabilizing, and the other which overshot and had destabiliz-
ing effects. In fact, the only clear case of this occurred in 1955, when the total
effect was about twice as strong as necessary to push the economy towards its
full potential.
With these definitions and caveats in mind, the data of Table 4 can be inter-
preted. It summarizes the pertinent relationships on a cumulated basis for the
sixteen-year period. The cumulated amount of potential stabilization (Item 1)
amounted to about 55 per cent (of a typical year's output). By far the major
portion of this occurred at times when the economy was below its potential,
although the economy was potentially overheated in four of the sixteen years.
If we look at the (gross) stabilizing effects alone (Item 2), we find that about
twice as much occurred when the economy was below its potential as when it
was above it. But these desirable effects were somewhat diminished by the occa-
sions when the budget impact was destablizing (Item 3); and we notice that this
was due more to excessive expansionary effects, than to dampening effects when
the economy was below its potential. Thus, the net stabilizing effects were less
than they would have otherwise been (Item 4) but were nevertheless substantial.
On a net basis the budget impact helped to reduce the cumulated gap between
the pure cycle and the full employment potential by about 37 per cent (Item 6).
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TABLE 4
TOTAL EFFECTS AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION, 1952-67
(EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF POTENTIAL GNP)
Per Cent
1. Total (absolute) divergence between pure cycle
and potential GNP..................................... 55.2
a. Above potential ..................................... 10.0
b. Below potential...................................... 45.2
2. Sum of stabilizing effects................................. 26.6
a. Above potential ..................................... 9.1
b. Below potential...................................... 17.5
3. Sum of destabilizing effects............................... 6.4
a. Above potential ..................................... 4.9
b. Below potential...................................... 1.5
4. Net stabilizing effects (2 minus 3)......................... 20.2
a. Above potential ..................................... 4.2
b. Below potential...................................... 16.0
5. Total divergence between actual and
potential GNP (1 minus 4).............................. 35.0
a. Above potential ..................................... 5.8
b. Below potential...................................... 29.2
6. Net stabilization achieved (4 + 1).......................... 36.6
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our purpose has not been to analyze the intent of budget policies but rather
to estimate their effect. Policy statements issued by governments everywhere
generally tend to accord with what might be agreed are desirable policies. But
ex ante proclamations of intent sometimes turn out never to have materialized.
Hence we have not concerned ourselves with the public pronouncements but
have instead estimated the actual impact of budgetary policies on domestic de-
mand and their relation to both short and long-term stabilization.
We have provided a number of different insights into the relative importance
of various kinds of budget changes during the period 1952-67. Considering the
comparatively small size of the public sector in Japan, it has had an expansion-
ary impact which was relatively larger in accounting for the very high GNP
growth rate than in the West. The budgetary impact did little on balance to
dampen the rather strong and frequent short-term swings in demand. If the
criterion of helping to achieve the longer-term objective of the full utilization
of Japan's potential resources is used instead, however, a different conclusion is
reached. In this case we found that the Japanese budgetary policies were a con-
siderable stabilizing factor. In this respect, Japan offers an example that is near-
ly the exact opposite of the United States, where the impact of the budget
through both discretionary and automatic changes contributed considerably to
smoothing out fluctuations in demand which would have otherwise been even
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TABLE 5
SHORT AND LONG-TERM STABILIZING IMPACT OF BUDGET CHANGES
(CUMULATED PERCENTAGE OF GNP FOR 1955-65)
Short-Term Long-Term
Potential Net Potential Net
Stabilization Stabilization Stabilization Stabilization
Belgium 24 6 40 4
France 14 2 24 7
Germany 33 13 20 3
Italy 21 9 44 9
JAPAN 38 6 38 19
Sweden 22 8 21 13
United Kingdom 15 1 19 5
United States 48 19 55 10
stronger than they actually were but where little was done to make full use of
the country's long-run potential.
These two measures of stabilization are both relevant and related. Most eco-
nomists would agree that ceteris paribus, a stable rate of economic growth is pref-
erable to one which fluctuates, because of the side effects the latter can have on
employment, prices, and balance of payments stability. But most would also
agree that this is of less concern if the country is not functioning near its poten-
tial capacity. These two measures of stabilization-short and long-term-are
available for the seven countries in the original Hansen study, and in Table 5
Japan has been added with the data appropriately adjusted and accounted for
the same period 1955-65.
No two countries are quite alike in their experiences with short- and long-
term stabilization, but a lengthy comparison is unnecessary. Suffice it to say that
Japan had a relatively large amount of both kinds of potential stabilization but
the budgetary impact helped much more to keep the economy functioning close
to its full capacity utilization than it did to help smooth out potential short-run
fluctuations in demand which were sometimes adversely affected by budget
changes. Nevertheless, Japan's achievement of short-term stabilization was only
somewhat below par as compared with the performance of the seven other coun-
tries.12 Its achievement of long-term stabilization was superior and only sur-
passed by Sweden.
Perhaps this is not a surprising conclusion. For Japan's postwar growth has
been phenomenally high. When the periods of overheating (which as we have
seen were almost always accompanied by an exogenously determined slowdown
in exports) called forth deflationary policies, more often monetary than budg-
etary, the result produced the rather frequent and pronounced swings in output
and demand, albeit each short-lived. It used to be said sometimes that a high
12 This conclusion differs from our earlier statement about net short-term stabilization (pp. 93-
94) because it refers to a different period.
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growth rate would be inevitably accompanied by sharp and frequent cyclical
swings; it would be reassuring if Japan could direct its future economic policies
towards maintaining its uniquely high growth rate while at the same time
achieving a greater degree of stable growth.




Billion I % GNP Billion % GNP
Yen Yen _ _
GNP at market prices 5,481.5 100.0 44,707.6 100.0
1. Total Current Revenue 1,184.5 21.6 8,822.1 19.7
a. Contributions to Social Security 95.2 1.7 1, 594.2 3.6
b. Other direct taxes on households 283.3 5.2 1,742.9 3.9
c. Direct taxes on corporations 241.3 4.4 1,763.6 3.9
d. Indirect taxes 510.7 9.3 3,356.1 7.5
e. Other income1  54.0 1.0 365.3 0.8
2. Total Current Expenditure 712.5 13.0 6,533.8 14.6
a. Goods and services 555.2 10.1 3,862.3 8.6
b. Subsidies 37.6 0.7 415.3 0.9
c. Interest on public debt 7.3 0.1 225.9 0.5
d. Transfers 112.4 2.1 2,030.3 4.5
3. Net Savings (1lminus 2) 472.0 8.6 2,288.3 5.1
4. Less: Gross fixed asset formation 263.0 4.8 2,278.8 5.1
5. Net Lending 209.0 3.8 9.5 0.0
1 Transfers received plus income from property and entrepeneurship.





Billion | % GNP Billion %GNP
Yen | Yen _ _
GNP at market prices 5,481.5 100.0 44,707.6 100.0
1. Current Revenue
a. Direct taxes on households (225.7) (4.1) 1,226.7 2.7
b. Direct taxes on corporations (189.9) (3.5) 1,550.0 3.5
c. Indirect taxes (307.4) (5.6) 1,756.9 3.9
2. Current Expenditure for Goods and
Services (142.5) (2.6) 1,466.8 3.3
3. Gross Fixed Asset Formation 91.9 1.7 1,087.2 2.4
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on National Income Statistics 
(1951-
67).




Billion % GNP Billion GNP
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Yen _ __ Yen IGN
GNP at market prices 5,481.5 100.0 44,707.6 100.0
1. Current Revenue
a. Direct taxes on households 57.6 1.1 516.1 1.2
b. Direct taxes on corporations 51.4 0.9 213.6 0.5
c. Indirect taxes 203.3 3.7 1,599.3 3.6
2. Current Expenditure for Goods and
Services 401.2 7.3 2,395.5 5.4
3. Gross Fixed Asset Formation 171.1 3.1 1,191.6 2.7
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on National
67).
Income Statistics (1951- 1
TABLE A4
SOCIAL SECURITY, GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC CORPORATION INVESTMENT
INCREASE IN STOCKS BY ENTERPRISES AND PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
1951 1967
Billion %GNP Billion IGNP
____________ Yen I%~ Yen GN
GNP at market prices 5,436.8 100.0 44,707.6 100.0
I . Social Security
A. Total Revenue 95.2 1.7 1,594.2 3.6
1. Contribution by employers n.a. (0. 9)a 909.6 2.0
2. Contribution by insured persons n.a. (0.8)a 684.6 1.5
B. Total Expenditure
1. Transfers to households 89.9 1.6 1,546.0 3.5
C. Net Savings 5.2 0.1 48.2 0.1
II. Covernment Enterprise and Public
Corporation Investment 95.1 1.7 1,689.4 3.8
A. Central Government 76.0 1.4 1,301.4 2.9
B. Local Government 19.2 0.4 388.0 0.9
III. Government Enterprise and Public
Corporation Change in Stocks 40.4 0.7 346.8 0.8
A. Central Government 40.2 0.7 344.5 0.8
B. Local Government 0.3 0.0 2.3 0.0
a Based on relative shares in 1955.
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on
67).
National Income Statistics (1951-
TABLE AS
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
AUTOMATIC RESPONSE OF TOTAL TAXES
Billion Yen
GNP at Annual change Annual change Discretionary Automatic Marginal AverageYear factor cost in GNP Total taxes in total taxes change in change in response response Elasticity
total taxes total taxes rate rate
(1) (2)=(l),-(1),--j (3) (4)=(3),-(3),-1 (5) (6)=(4)--(5) (7)=(6)/(2) (8)=(3)/(l) (9)=(7)/(8)
1951 4,970.8 730.0
1952 5,755.3 784.5 851.6 121.6 -87.1 208.7 26.6 14.8 1.80
1953 6,818.3 1,063.0 952.8 101.2 -126.0 227.2 21.4 14.0 1.53
1954 7,079.2 260.9 944.0 -8.8 -14.0 5.2 2.0 13.3 0.15
1955 8,104.2 1,025.0 947.1 3.1 -66.1 69.2 6.8 11.7 0.58
1956 9,082.2 978.0 1,096.2 149.1 -14.9 164.0 16.8 12.1 1.39
1957 10,258.3 1,176.1 1,215.0 118.8 -61.7 180.5 15.3 11.8 1.30
1958 10,736.7 478.4 1,215.2 0.2 -34.1 34.3 7.2 11.3 0.64
1959 12,427.1 1,690.4 1,416.7 201.5 -9.5 211.0 12.5 11.4 1.10
1960 14,776.5 2,349.4 1,826.6 409.9 6.6 403.3 17.2 12.4 1.39
1961 18,122.8 3,346.3 2,264.3 437.7 -74.4 512.1 15.3 12.5 1.22
1962 19,845.2 1,722.4 2,438.9 174.6 -114.0 288.6 16.8 12.3 1.37
1963 23,520.6 3,675.4 2,783.3 344.4 -49.8 394.2 10.7 11.8 0.91
1964 27,206.9 3,686.3 3,185.8 402.4 -108.3 510.7 13.9 11.7 1.19
1965 30,165.6 2,958.7 3,396.3 210.5 -111.1 321.6 10.9 11.3 0.96
1966 35,268.6 5,103.0 3,773.8 377.5 -295.6 673.1 13.2 10.7 1.23
1967 41,351.5 6,082.9 4,533.6 759.8 -90.9 850.7 14.0 11.0 1.27
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on National Income Statistics (1951-67) and estimates of discretionary tax classes fur-










AUTOMATIC RESPONSE OF INDIRECT TAXES
Billion Yen
Marginal Average
Annual change Discretionary Automatic response responseYear Total Annualchangchange change rate rate Elasticity
(Percentage) (Percentage)
(1) (2)=(1),-(1),-1 (3) (4)=(2)-(3) (5) (6) (7)=(5)/(6)
1951 307.4
1952 381.7 74.3 6.5 67.8 8.64 6.63 1.30
1953 455.6 73.9 -33.2 107.1 10.08 6.68 1.51
1954 440.1 -15.5 20.0 -35.5 -13.61 6.22 -2.19
1955 451.4 11.3 -0.8 12.1 1.18 5.57 0.21
1956 508.9 57.5 -6.7 64.2 6.56 5.60 1.17
1957 573.4 64.5 26.6 37.9 3.22 5.59 0.58
1958 612.4 39.0 -6.3 45.3 9.48 5.70 1.66
1959 693.1 80.2 17.4 63.3 3.74 5.58 0.67
1960 826.6 133.5 6.6 126.9 5.40 5.59 0.97
1961 1,005.1 178.5 21.8 156.7 4.68 5.55 0.84
1962 1,015.4 10.3 -62.4 72.7 4.22 5.12 0.82
1993 1,155.6 140.2 4.2 136.0 3.70 4.91 0.75
1964 1,270.4 114.8 24.8 90.0 2.44 4.67 0.52
1965 1,349.4 79.0 10.9 68.1 2.30 4.47 0.51
1966 1, 506.6 157.2 -38.6 195.8 3.84 4.27 0.90




Source: Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on National Income Statistics (1951-67) and estimates of
nished by the Ministry of Finance.
discretionary tax classes fur-
TABLE A7
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
AUTOMATIC RESPONSE OF DIRECT TAXES ON HOUSEHOLDS (INC. CHARGES)
Billion Yen
Marginal Average
Year Total Annual change Discretionary Automatic response response Elasticitychange change rate rate
(Percentage) (Percentage)
(1) (2)=(1)r-(1)r-1 (3) (4)=(2)-(3) (5) (6) (7)=(5)/(6)
1951 232.7
1952 276.9 44.2 -112.7 156.9 20.0 4.81 4.16
1953 300.3 23.4 -77.3 100.7 9.47 4.41 2.15
1954 293.6 -6.7 -31.4 24.7 9.47 4.15 2.28
1955 287.0 -6.6 -53.3 46.7 4.56 3.54 1.29
1956 318.3 31.3 -22.6 53.9 5.51 3.50 1.57
1957 263.7 -54.6 -110.2 55.6 4.73 2.57 1.84
1958 259.9 -3.8 -6.3 2.5 0.52 2.42 0.21
1959 276.1 16.2 -23.1 39.3 2.32 2.22 1.05
1960 380.4 104.3 0.0 104.3 4.44 2.57 1.73
1961 481.9 101.5 -56.3 157.8 4.72 2.66 1.77
1962 556.9 75.0 -50.3 125.3 7.27 2.81 2.59
1963 696.2 139.3 -66.8 206.1 5.61 2.96 1.90
1964 851.3 155.0 -74.5 229.5 6.23 3.13 1.99
1965 964.8 113.5 -65.4 178.9 6.05 3.20 1.89
1966 1,071.3 106.5 -158.3 264.8 5.19 3.04 1.71







Source: Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on National Income Statistics (1951-67) and estimates of
nished by the Ministry of Finance.
discretionary tax classes fur-
TABLE A8
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
AUTOMATIC RESPONSE OF DIRECT TAXES ON CORPORATIONS
Billion Yen
Marginal Average
Year Total Annual change Discretionary Automatic response response Elasticity
change change rate rate
(Percentage) (Percentage)
(1) (2)=(1),-(1),- (3) (4)=(2)-(3) (5) (6) (7)=(5)/(6)
1951 189.9
1952 193.0 3.1 19.1 -16.0 -2.04 3.35 -0.61
1953 196.9 3.9 -15.5 19.4 1.82 2.89 0.63
1954 210.3 13.4 -2.6 16.0 6.13 2.97 2.06
1955 208.7 -1.6 -12.0 10.4 1.01 2.58 0.39
1956 269.0 60.3 14.4 45.9 4.69 2.96 1.58
1957 377.9 108.9 21.9 87.0 7.40 3.68 2.01
1958 342.9 -35.0 -21.5 -13.5 -2.82 3.19 -0.88
1959 447.5 104.6 -3.8 108.4 6.41 3.60 1.78
1960 619.6 172.1 0.0 172.1 7.33 4.19 1.75
1961 777.3 157.7 -39.9 197.6 5.91 4.29 1.38
1962 866.6 89.3 -1.3 90.6 5.26 4.37 1.20
1963 931.5 64.9 12.8 52.1 1.42 3.96 0.36
1964 1,064.1 132.6 -58.6 191.2 5.19 3.91 1.33
1965 1,082.1 18.0 -56.6 74.6 2.52 3.59 0.70
1966 1,195.9 113.8 -98.7 212.5 4.16 3.39 1.23
1967 1,550.0 354.1 -30.3 384.4 6.32 3.75 1.69
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on National Income Statistics (1951-67) and estimates of discretionary tax classes fur-
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